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Abstract—The problem of wireless networked control under
the joint effects of disturbance and jamming attacks is investi-
gated. Specifically, the control input packets are assumed to be
transmitted from the controller to a linear plant over an insecure
wireless communication channel that faces jamming attacks. The
time-varying likelihood of transmission failures on this channel
depends on the power of the jamming interference signal emitted
by an attacker. We show that jamming attacks and disturbance can
jointly prevent stability even if the attacked system without distur-
bance is stable. We also show that stability under jamming and
disturbance can be achieved if the average jamming interference
power is restricted in a certain way that we characterize in the
paper. We provide a numerical example to illustrate our results.
Index Terms—Networked control, cyber-security, wire-
less networks, jamming interference, disturbance
I. INTRODUCTION
As the Internet of Things is gaining popularity, the use of wireless
communication channels and the Internet is increasing in remote
control applications. These communication technologies are easy to
set up and they provide efficiency in the transmission of measurement
and control data, but they can create major cyber-security issues in a
networked system [1]. In the framework of cyber-physical systems,
researchers have identified a range of potential cyber attacks with
different properties [2]–[4]. For instance, an attacker who is knowl-
edgeable about the system dynamics can disrupt control operation
by injecting false data into the system or altering measurement
and control data [5], [6]. Attackers with limited information can
also cause cyber-security issues by means of denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks to prevent communication over networks. For example, a
jamming attacker can effectively prevent transmission of packets over
wireless channels by emitting sufficiently strong interference signals,
[7]. Jamming attacks can cause performance issues and instability in
wireless networked control systems.
The effects of jamming and other Denial-of-Service attacks in
control systems have recently been investigated in a few works (see
[8] for an overview). In those works various attack models have
been considered. For instance, [9] considered a model where the
attacker conducts cycles of sleeping and jamming in a repetitive
fashion. Moreover, the works [10]–[13] considered models that allow
the timing of attack strategies to be arbitrary as long as the average
attack duration and the average frequency of attacks satisfy certain
bounds. It was first observed in [10] that when a networked control
system is subject to disturbance, duration and frequency conditions
for attacks need to be stronger to guarantee stability in comparison
to the case without disturbance.
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In this paper, our goal is to investigate the combined effects of
disturbance and jamming attacks specifically for wireless networked
control problems within a probabilistic framework. In particular,
we consider the control problem over a wireless channel, where
the transmission failure model is characterized through the time-
dependent Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise-Ratio (SINR), which is
the ratio of the transmission power of the signal to the jamming
attacker’s interference power summed with the channel noise power.
A jamming signal with a strong interference power results in a smaller
SINR, which ends up increasing the likelihood of a packet loss.
Previously, SINR-based channel models were used by [14]–[16] for
game-theoretic analysis of remote state estimation problems under
jamming attacks. Moreover, in [17], a probabilistic channel model
was considered in a networked control problem setting and optimal
attack policies were explored for the case where the total number of
attacks in a fixed interval is bounded. In [18], we used an SINR-
based probabilistic model to investigate a discrete-time networked
stabilization problem for scenarios where there is no disturbance, but
a jamming attacker can jam the wireless channel at each time instant
with a different interference power level that is unknown a priori.
Our results in [18] indicate that stabilization can be achieved if the
average interference power is bounded in the long run even if the
power can be very large at certain times.
In this paper we consider situations where the jamming attacker
can strategically change the interference levels at each time, as in
[18]. However, differently from [18], we now consider disturbance,
and through stochastic analysis, we show that when the dynamics is
subject to disturbance, jamming attacks can potentially become more
dangerous. Our results indicate that a strategic attacker may take
advantage of the disturbance to cause instability even if the attacked
system without disturbance is stable. Specifically, the attacker can
cause the state norm to grow to arbitrarily large values with arbitrarily
high probabilities, while keeping the average jamming interference
power below a threshold in the long run. Thus, as in the deterministic
case discussed in [10], a restriction is also needed in this paper. We
consider a probabilistic model and the attacker can only partially
affect the occurrence probability of a transmission failure. We show
that when jamming attacks are restricted so that the wireless channel
is not subject to long consecutive emissions of high powered inter-
ference signals, then the first moment of the state stays bounded.
Interestingly, even under such restrictions, the wireless channel may
be attacked at all time instants with small interference powers and
thus for any finite interval, there is always a positive probability that
all transmission attempts may fail. In this aspect, our setting differs
from the deterministic case, where the maximum possible length of
a continuous attack duration is required to be bounded to ensure
input-to-state stability under disturbance.
As a first step, we investigate the scenarios where the norm of the
disturbance is bounded almost surely at each time by a fixed scalar. In
such scenarios, the first moment of the state is bounded under attacks
from an attacker with sufficiently small resources. Then we explore
the more general case where the distribution of the disturbance norm
may have infinite support. For this case, we obtain an inequality for
the first moment of state that resembles those used for establishing
noise-to-state stability in stochastic systems (e.g., [19], [20]). In
particular, we obtain an upper bound of the first moment of the
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Fig. 1. Operation of networked control system under jamming attacks
state by utilizing the second moment of the disturbance. In our
analysis, a key technical role is played by a nondecreasing and
concave function of the attacker’s interference power that upper-
bounds the transmission failure probability. In addition, the use of the
first moment of the state in the analysis facilitates the investigation
of cross product terms that involve the disturbance and the indicator
process for transmission failures through induced matrix norms. A
practical consequence is that our results can be used in the scenarios
where the transmission failures and the disturbance are statistically
dependent. This is for example the case when the disturbance is
partially or fully caused by attacker’s actions and the jamming
interference in the wireless channel results in packet content errors.
The paper is organized as follows. We explain the wireless net-
worked control problem under jamming attacks in Section II. In
Section III, we first discuss the case without disturbance, then we
explain the joint effects of jamming interference and disturbance, and
moreover, we provide an analysis for the system with disturbance. We
present a numerical example in Section IV, and finally we conclude
the paper in Section V. Our preliminary conference report [21]
contains some of the results. In this paper, we provide the proofs,
additional detailed discussions, and a new example.
Throughout the paper, we use N and N0 to denote the sets
of positive and nonnegative integers, respectively. Moreover, ‖·‖2
denotes the Euclidean norm, P[·] and E[·] respectively denote the
probability and the expectation on a probability space (Ω,F , P).
II. NETWORKED CONTROL UNDER JAMMING ATTACKS
We consider the networked control problem of a discrete-time
linear plant with a static state feedback controller. As illustrated in
Fig. 1, a wireless communication channel is used for transmission of
control input packets from the controller to the plant. This channel
is subject to transmission failures at certain times due to interference
caused by the jamming signal of an attacker.
In the networked control operation, at each time step t, the
controller computes a control input using the state information and
attempts to transmit it on the wireless channel. If the transmission is
successful, then the transmitted control input is applied at the plant
side. If, on the other hand, there is a transmission failure, then the
control input at the plant side is set to 0. In this setting, the dynamics
of the plant is given by
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) + (1− l(t))BuC(t) + wP(t), (1)
where x(t) ∈ Rn is the state, uC(t) ∈ Rm is the control input that
is attempted to be transmitted by the controller to the plant at time
t, wP(t) ∈ Rn is the disturbance, and l(t) ∈ {0, 1} represents the
transmission status (with l(t) = 1 indicating failure and l(t) = 0
indicating success). Moreover, A ∈ Rn×n is the unstable system
matrix and Bn×m is the input matrix.
The likelihood of a transmission failure depends on the power of
the jamming interference signal. If the interference power is large,
then it is more likely that there is a transmission failure. In particular,
with v(t) ∈ [0,∞) denoting the jamming interference power at time
t, the transmission failure indicator l(t) in (1) is given by
l(t) , 1[r(t) ≤ p(v(t))], t ∈ N0, (2)
where, p : [0,∞) → [0, 1] is a Borel-measurable, nondecreasing
function, and r(0), r(1), . . . are independent random variables that
are distributed uniformly in [0, 1]. Furthermore {r(t) ∈ [0, 1]}t∈N0
and {v(t) ∈ [0,∞)}t∈N0 are assumed to be mutually independent
processes. Notice that for a fixed scalar ϑ, we represent by p(ϑ)
the conditional probability of a transmission failure given that the
jamming interference power is set to ϑ. In particular, (2) implies
P[l(t) = 1|v(t) = ϑ] = P[r(t) ≤ p(ϑ)|v(t) = ϑ]
= P[r(t) ≤ p(ϑ)] = p(ϑ).
Observe that, if v(t) is large so that p(v(t)) is close to 1, then
it becomes more likely that r(t) ≤ p(v(t)), and hence by (2), a
transmission failure is likely to occur. Note also that transmission
failures at different times are conditionally independent given the
interference powers at those times. Namely, for every t1 < t2 <
· · · < tk, k ∈ N,
P[l(t1) = 1, . . . , l(tk) = 1|v(t1) = ϑ1, . . . , v(tk) = ϑk]
=
k∏
i=1
P[l(ti) = 1|v(ti) = ϑi] =
k∏
i=1
p(ϑi).
The characterization in (2) enables us to describe security prop-
erties of different wireless channel models by utilizing different p
functions. For instance, to describe the additive white Gaussian noise
channel with quadrature amplitude modulation scheme considered in
[16], p can be selected as
p(ϑ) = 2Q
(√
c
ξ
ϑ+ σ
)
, (3)
where Q(y) , 1√
2pi
∫∞
y
e−
s
2
2 ds, ξ ∈ (0,∞) and σ ∈ (0,∞) are
constants associated respectively with the transmission power and the
power of the channel noise, and c ∈ (0,∞) is a constant associated
with the parameters of the communication protocol. Notice that the
term ξ
ϑ+σ in (3) corresponds to Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise-
Ratio (SINR), indicating the quality of a wireless channel [22]. Even
if there is no attack at time t (i.e., v(t) = ϑ = 0), there may still be
a transmission failure due to channel noise σ > 0, since p(0) > 0.
III. ANALYSIS OF NETWORKED STABILIZATION
In this section, we investigate the networked stabilization of the
plant (1) through a state-feedback controller, where the control input
transmitted by the controller is given by
uC(t) = Kx(t) + wC(t), t ∈ N0, (4)
where K ∈ Rm×n denotes the feedback gain, and wC(t) ∈ Rm is
used for describing malicious or nonmalicious disturbances on the
control input.
With w(t) , wP(t)+(1−l(t))BwC(t), the closed-loop networked
control system (1), (4) becomes
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) + (1− l(t))BKx(t) +w(t), t ∈ N0. (5)
In what follows, we first investigate the stability of (5) in the
disturbance-free case. Then we discuss how a strategic jamming
attacker can take advantage of the disturbance to prevent stabilization.
Finally, we obtain conditions of stability under disturbance.
A. Stabilization in the Disturbance-Free Case
For the case without disturbance (w(t) = 0, t ∈ N0), our previous
work [18] shows that stabilization can be achieved if the long run
average jamming interference power is bounded by a sufficiently
small scalar. In particular, the characterization in [18] allows the
interference power v(t) to arbitrarily change at each time t as long
as it satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 3.1: There exist scalars κ, v ≥ 0 such that
P
[ t−1∑
i=0
v(i) ≤ κ+ vt] = 1, t ∈ N. (6)
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Here, v ≥ 0 is an asymptotic upper-bound on the average
interference power (i.e., lim supk→∞ 1k
∑k−1
t=0 v(t) ≤ v). Notice
that if p in (2) is a concave function, then p(v) can be used in the
stability analysis as an upper bound on the long run average number
of transmission failures. On the other hand, if p is not concave, then
a concave function that upper-bounds p can be used for the same
purpose. To this end, we utilized in [18] a continuous, nondecreasing,
and concave function pˆ : [0,∞)→ [0, 1] such that
pˆ(v) ≥ p(v), v ∈ [0,∞). (7)
As discussed in [18], such a pˆ always exists, and moreover,
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
i=0
l(i) ≤ pˆ(v), (8)
almost surely. In other words, the average number of transmission
failures is upper bounded in the long run by pˆ(v). The inequality (8)
was used in [18] for establishing stability of the closed-loop system
(5) in the case without disturbance. The analysis in [18] indicates that
if v is sufficiently small, then the closed-loop system is asymptotically
stable almost surely, implying P[limt→∞ ‖x(t)‖2 = 0] = 1.
In addition, moment stability of the networked control system can
also be analyzed under Assumption 3.1. In particular, the following
result provides a condition under which the first-moment of the state
(E[‖x(t)‖2]) converges to zero at a geometric rate. In presentation
of this result, we use induced matrix norms (see Section 5.6 in [23]).
Specifically, for a given matrix M ∈ Rn×n, let ‖M‖ denote the
induced matrix norm defined by ‖M‖ , supx∈Rn\{0} ‖Mx‖‖x‖ , where
‖ · ‖ on the right-hand side denotes a vector norm on Rn.
Proposition 3.1: Consider the closed-loop networked control sys-
tem (1), (4) for the case where w(t) = 0, t ∈ N0. Suppose that the
attacker’s interference power process {v(t) ∈ [0,∞)}t∈N0 satisfies
Assumption 3.1. Moreover, assume
(1− pˆ(v))‖A+BK‖+ pˆ(v)‖A‖ < 1. (9)
Then the closed-loop system (1), (4) is first-moment geometrically
stable, that is, there exist µ ≥ 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1) such that
E[‖x(t)‖2] ≤ µθt‖x0‖2, t ∈ N. (10)
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 3.1 provides a method to check the first-moment
geometric stability of the system (1), (4) under jamming attacks
that satisfy Assumption 3.1. The scalars ‖A + BK‖ and ‖A‖ in
condition (9) respectively represent the behavior of the closed-loop
dynamics under successful transmissions and the open-loop dynamics
under failed transmissions. Here, we select the matrix norm ‖ · ‖ to
ensure ‖A + BK‖ < 1. This is possible since the feedback gain
K is designed to make A + BK a Schur matrix, for which such a
matrix norm can be constructed (see Corollary 9.3.4 of [23]). On the
other hand, for unstable open-loop dynamics, we have ‖A‖ > 1.
Notice that the inequality in (9) holds if the upper bound v of
the average jamming interference power is sufficiently small so that
pˆ(v) is sufficiently close to zero. In such cases, transmission failures
happen sufficiently rarely in average, and thus the overall networked
control system frequently follows the stable behavior of the closed-
loop dynamics and the geometric convergence of the first-moment
of the state as in (10) can be guaranteed. As we establish in the
proof given in the Appendix, the scalar θ in (10) represents the
rate of convergence, and it depends on pˆ(v) as well as the scalars
‖A + BK‖ and ‖A‖. In particular, if the bound v on the long run
average jamming interference power is small, then θ is also small,
indicating faster convergence of the first-moment.
Remark 3.2: First-moment geometric stability discussed in Propo-
sition 3.1 is a stronger notion of stochastic stability in comparison
to almost-sure asymptotic stability explored in [18]. As expected,
first-moment geometric stability condition (10) is more restrictive
with respect to the attack parameter v. Specifically, the almost-
sure asymptotic stability condition presented in Theorem 3.5 of [18]
reduces to
(1− pˆ(v)) ln ‖A +BK‖+ pˆ(v) ln ‖A‖ < 0, (11)
with ‖·‖ denoting the matrix norm induced by the vector norm
‖x‖P ,
√
xTPx where P ∈ Rn×n is a positive-definite matrix.
For this matrix norm, (9) implies (11).
B. Joint Effects of Jamming Interference and Disturbance
We next look at the case with disturbance. We observe that in
this case, jamming attacks can become considerably more dangerous.
Even if the disturbance is very small and the attacker has very
limited jamming resources, there still exist attack strategies that can
destabilize the system while satisfying Assumption 3.1 with very
small v. We illustrate this idea in the following example.
Example 3.1: Consider a scalar networked control system (1), (4)
with x0 > 0, A + BK ∈ [0, 1), A > 1, and constant disturbance
w(t) = w∗ > 0, t ∈ N0. Suppose that the conditional probability
p of transmission failures is a strictly increasing function (e.g., p
given by (3)). For this setup, an attacker can wait for a sufficiently
long duration and then attack for a duration with a sufficiently large
interference power so that the state norm grows to large values but
the average interference power does not go above v. In particular, for
any v > 0, x0 > 0, z > 0, and ρ ∈ (0, 1), the attack strategy
v(t) ,
{
v∗, t ∈ {τ1, . . . , τ1 + τ2 − 1},
0, otherwise,
(12)
with v∗ , p−1(ρ
1
τ2 ) + 1, τ1 , ⌊max{v
∗−v,0}τ2
v ⌋ + 1, τ2 ,⌊max{logA(z/w∗), 0}⌋ + 1 guarantees that Assumption 3.1 is sat-
isfied and the state exceeds the value z with probability larger than
ρ at time τ , τ1 + τ2, i.e., P[x(τ ) > z] > ρ.
To show this, first we define the event E(τ1, τ2) ∈ F by
E(τ1, τ2) ,
{
ω ∈ Ω: l(t) = 1, t ∈ {τ1, . . . , τ1 + τ2 − 1}
}
.
This is the event that all packet transmissions during t ∈
{τ1, . . . , τ1+τ2−1} fail. By (12), we have P[E(τ1, τ2)] = pτ2(v∗).
Now, since x0 > 0, A > 1, and w
∗ > 0, we obtain x(t) ≥ w∗,
t ∈ N. Therefore,
P[x(τ ) > z] ≥ P[x(τ ) > z |E(τ1, τ2)]P[E(τ1, τ2)]
≥ P[Aτ2x(τ1) +
τ2−1∑
i=0
Aiw∗ > z |E(τ1, τ2)]pτ2(v∗)
≥ P[Aτ2w∗ > z |E(τ1, τ2)]pτ2(v∗) > 1 · ρ
τ2
τ2 = ρ.
Furthermore, the attack strategy (12) satisfies Assumption 3.1 with
κ = 0, because τ1 ≥ max{v
∗−v,0}τ2
v ≥ (v
∗−v)τ2
v , and thus,∑τ−1
i=0 v(i) = v
∗τ2 ≤ v(τ1 + τ2) = vτ .
The attack strategy (12) can make the state grow arbitrarily large
even if the interference power bound v is very small. This attack
strategy is effective, because even if the attacker initially waits for
a long duration without attacking, the state never reaches a small
neighborhood of zero due to the disturbance. Hence, after waiting for
a while, the attacker can consecutively attack with high interference
powers to cause many transmission failures and make the state norm
grow to large values. This is further illustrated in Section IV.
C. Jamming Interference and Bounded Disturbance
To ensure stability under both disturbance and jamming, the attacks
need to be restricted in a way that high jamming interference powers
at consecutive times are not allowed. To this end, we consider the
following assumption.
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Assumption 3.2: There exist scalars κˆ, vˆ ≥ 0 such that
P
[ t2−1∑
i=t1
v(i) ≤ κˆ+ vˆ(t2 − t1)
]
= 1, (13)
for all t1, t2 ∈ N0 with t1 < t2.
Notice that (13) implies (6) (with κ = κˆ and v = vˆ), but the
converse is not true. Assumption 3.2 is thus more restrictive than
Assumption 3.1. In particular, under Assumption 3.2, the attacker
can attack with a jamming interference power v∗ > vˆ consecutively
for at most ⌊κˆ/(v∗ − vˆ)⌋ time steps; thus, the destabilizing attacks
discussed in Example 3.1 are avoided.
Assumption 3.2 is related to other characterizations of malicious
attacks in the literature. In particular, in the continuous-time deter-
ministic denial-of-service attack characterization of [10], the number
of attacks in a given time frame as well as the total duration of
those attacks are bounded by certain ratios of the length of that time
frame. Under that characterization, the maximum possible length of
a continuous attack duration is bounded, which enables analysis of
input-to-state stability under disturbance. The restriction on jamming
through Assumption 3.2 is similar, since long consecutive emissions
of high powered interference signals are not allowed. We note,
however, that Assumption 3.2 allows the scenario where the channel
is attacked at all times if the attacker’s interference power for certain
times is small. Notice that emission of interference signals in jamming
attacks require energy [7]. In this respect, Assumption 3.2 can
describe the constraints of an attacker with limited energy resources.
In this section, we investigate the networked control system (5)
under bounded disturbance. The analysis is then extended in Sec-
tion III-D to the case where the disturbance has finite second moments
but its norm may not be bounded by a fixed scalar.
In this paper, we consider scenarios where the norm of the distur-
bance does not approach zero, and hence the state or its moments may
not converge to the origin. Instead of exploring asymptotic stability,
our goal is to obtain conditions for the first moment of the state to
stay bounded. To this end, let Aˆ(t) , l(t)A+ (1− l(t))(A+BK),
t ∈ N0, and moreover, for every t1, t2 ∈ N0 with t1 ≤ t2, let
F (t2, t1) ,
{
Aˆ(t2), t1 = t2,
Aˆ(t2) · · · Aˆ(t1), t1 < t2.
For the closed-loop system (5), we have x(t) = F (t − 1, 0)x0 +∑t−2
j=0 F (t−1, j+1)w(j)+w(t−1), for t ∈ N. Therefore, for any
induced norm ‖ · ‖, it follows from the triangle inequality and the
submultiplicativity property that
‖x(t)‖ ≤
( t−1∏
i=0
‖Aˆ(i)‖
)
‖x0‖+
t−2∑
j=0
( t−1∏
i=j+1
‖Aˆ(i)‖
)
‖w(j)‖
+ ‖w(t− 1)‖.
Here, we have ‖Aˆ(i)‖ = l(i)‖A‖ + (1 − l(i))‖A + BK‖, i ∈ N0.
Hence, by letting
ζ1 , ‖A‖ − ‖A+BK‖, ζ0 = ‖A +BK‖, (14)
we obtain for t ∈ N,
‖x(t)‖ ≤
( t−1∏
i=0
(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
)
‖x0‖
+
t−2∑
j=0
( t−1∏
i=j+1
(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
)
‖w(j)‖+ ‖w(t− 1)‖.
By using this inequality, we can also obtain an upper-bound of the
Euclidean norm of the state. Specifically, by Corollary 5.4.5 of [23],
there exist c1 > 0 and c2 > c1 such that
c1‖y‖ ≤ ‖y‖2 ≤ c2‖y‖, y ∈ Rn. (15)
Therefore, we have
‖x(t)‖2 ≤ c2
c1
(( t−1∏
i=0
(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
)
‖x0‖2
+
t−2∑
j=0
( t−1∏
i=j+1
(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
)
‖w(j)‖2 + ‖w(t− 1)‖2
)
.
(16)
Notice here that the particular values of c1 and c2 depend on the
choice of the vector norm that induces the matrix norm ‖ · ‖.
We use (16) to provide bounds on the first moment E[‖x(t)‖2]
of the state. First, in the following result, we consider the case
where the disturbance is bounded and the jamming attacks satisfy
Assumption 3.2.
Theorem 3.3: Consider the closed-loop networked control system
(5). Suppose that the attacker’s interference power process {v(t) ∈
[0,∞)}t∈N0 satisfies Assumption 3.2. Furthermore, suppose that
there exists w ≥ 0 such that
P[‖w(t)‖2 ≤ w] = 1, t ∈ N. (17)
If
(1− pˆ(vˆ))‖A+BK‖+ pˆ(vˆ)‖A‖ < 1, (18)
then there exist µˆ ≥ 0, θˆ ∈ (0, 1), and dˆ ≥ 0 such that
E[‖x(t)‖2] ≤ µˆθˆt‖x0‖2 + dˆw, t ∈ N. (19)
The proof of Theorem 3.3 is given later in the paper. Theorem 3.3
shows that if jamming attacks satisfy Assumption 3.2 with a suffi-
ciently small vˆ such that (18) holds, then the first moment of the
state stays bounded. Furthermore, the upper bound given in (19)
is geometrically decreasing towards the constant dˆw, where w is
an upper bound on the Euclidean norm of disturbance w(t). Notice
that the condition (18) of Theorem 3.3 and the condition (9) in the
disturbance-free case in Proposition 3.1 are in the same form, but
use different scalars vˆ and v due to the difference of the jamming
interference characterizations in Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2. We remark
that for attacks that satisfy both assumptions, we have v ≤ vˆ.
As we establish in the proof of Theorem 3.3, the first moment upper
bound in (19) depends on attack parameters κˆ and vˆ. In particular, the
values of µˆ and dˆ are large, if kˆ and vˆ take large values. Moreover,
the scalar θˆ is directly related to the term (1 − pˆ(vˆ))‖A +BK‖ +
pˆ(vˆ)‖A‖ on the left-hand side of (18). If this term is close to zero,
then θˆ is close to zero, which indicates faster convergence of the
bound in (19) towards the constant dˆw. We note that (1− pˆ(vˆ))‖A+
BK‖ + pˆ(vˆ)‖A‖ represents the behavior of the overall networked
control system and it is composed of the convex combination of
terms ‖A + BK‖ and ‖A‖ weighted respectively with the lower
bound (1− pˆ(vˆ)) of the long-term ratio of successful transmissions
and upper bound pˆ(vˆ) of the long-term ratio of failed transmissions.
Our analysis approach differs from the more classical approaches
utilized in the cases where the transmission failure indicator process
{l(t) ∈ {0, 1}}t∈N0 is a Bernoulli process or a Markov chain. In
those cases, stability analysis can rely on the probability of failures
P[l(t) = 1] and conditional failure probabilities P[l(t) = q|l(t−1) =
r], q, r ∈ {0, 1}, (see [24], [25]). We remark that in our case, precise
information of such probability terms is not available due to the
uncertainty in the generation of attacks. Specifically, the interference
power v(t) at a given time t is part of attacker’s strategy and cannot be
known with certainty. As a result, the transmission failure probability
at that time is also uncertain and cannot be used in the analysis.
A crucial role in our analysis is played by the following lemma,
where we investigate the products of affine functions that involve the
transmission failure indicator l(·) and obtain upper bounds for their
expected values. As shown later in the proof of Theorem 3.3, such
upper bounds allow us to conduct stability analysis without relying on
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transmission failure probabilities for each time step. In the derivation
of these bounds, an essential step is to exploit the concavity of the
upper-bounding function pˆ given in (7).
Lemma 3.4: Suppose that the attacker’s interference power process
{v(t) ∈ [0,∞)}t∈N0 satisfies Assumption 3.2. Then for every α1 ≥
0, α0 ≥ 0 that satisfy
α1pˆ(vˆ) + α0 < 1, (20)
there exist scalars µ ≥ 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1) such that
E[
t2−1∏
i=t1
(α1l(i) + α0)] ≤ µθ(t2−t1), (21)
for t1, t2 ∈ N0 with t1 < t2.
Proof: For the case where α1 + α0 = 0, (21) holds for any
µ ≥ 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1). In the following, we consider the case where
α1 + α0 > 0. First, by Lemma 2.1 of [18],
E[
t2−1∏
i=t1
(α1l(i) + α0)] = E[
t2−1∏
i=t1
(α1p(v(i)) + α0)]. (22)
Next, by (22), α1 ≥ 0, and p(v) ≤ pˆ(v), v ∈ [0,∞), we get
E
[ t2−1∏
i=t1
(α1l(i) + α0)
] ≤ E[ t2−1∏
i=t1
h(v(i))
]
, (23)
where h(v) , α1pˆ(v) + α0. We note that h(·) is nondecreasing,
concave, and continuous, as pˆ(·) also has such properties and α1 ≥ 0.
To obtain an upper-bound for E[
∏t2−1
i=t1
h(v(i))] in (23), we first show
t2−1∏
i=t1
h(v(i)) ≤ h(t2−t1)( 1
t2 − t1
t2−1∑
i=t1
v(i)). (24)
We note that (24) holds if h(v(i)) = 0 for some i ∈ {t1, . . . , t2−1}.
Now, consider the case where h(v(i)) > 0 for all i ∈ {t1, . . . , t2 −
1}. For this case, we have
ln
t2−1∏
i=t1
h(v(i)) = (t2 − t1)
( 1
t2 − t1
t2−1∑
i=t1
ln h(v(i))
)
. (25)
Here, ln h(·) is concave, since it is the composition of a nonde-
creasing concave function ln(·) and a concave function h(·) (see
Proposition 2.16 in [26] and Section 3.2.4 in [27]). Thus, by (25),
ln
t2−1∏
i=t1
h(v(i)) ≤ (t2 − t1) ln h( 1
t2 − t1
t2−1∑
i=t1
v(i)), (26)
which implies (24). The interference power process v(·) satisfies (13)
in Assumption 3.2, and hence, 1t2−t1
∑t2−1
i=t1
v(i) ≤ κˆt2−t1 + vˆ,
almost surely. Thus, noting that h(·) is a nondecreasing function, by
(24), we obtain
∏t2−1
i=t1
h(v(i)) ≤ ht2−t1( κˆt2−t1 + vˆ), almost surely.
Consequently, we have
E
[ t2−1∏
i=t1
h(v(i))
] ≤ ht2−t1( κˆ
t2 − t1 + vˆ). (27)
Now, it follows from (20) that h(vˆ) < 1. Therefore, by the continuity
of h(·), there exists δ > 0 such that h(δ + vˆ) < 1. As a result, for
sufficiently large values of t2 − t1, we have h( κˆt2−t1 + vˆ) < 1.
Let T ∗ be a positive integer such that h( κˆT∗ + vˆ) < 1 and let
θ , h(
κˆ
T ∗
+ vˆ). (28)
It follows from (27) that
E
[ t2−1∏
i=t1
h(v(i))
] ≤ θt2−t1 , (29)
for all t1, t2 ∈ N0 such that t2 − t1 ≥ T ∗. If T ∗ = 1, then (21)
holds, by (29). If, on the other hand, T ∗ > 1, then by using h(v(t)) ≤
α1 + α0, t ∈ N0, we obtain
E
[ t2−1∏
i=t1
h(v(i))
] ≤ (α1 + α0)t2−t1 ≤ (α1 + α0)T∗−1 (30)
for all t1, t2 ∈ N0 such that 0 < t2 − t1 < T ∗. Letting
µ , (α1 + α0)
T∗−1θ−(T
∗−1), (31)
we obtain (21), by (29) and (30).
Lemma 3.4 shows that under Assumption 3.2, the expectation term
E[
∏t2−1
i=t1
(α1l(i) + α0)] with α1 ≥ 0, α0 ≥ 0 satisfying (20),
converges to zero at a geometric rate. By using this lemma, we obtain
the following result.
Lemma 3.5: Suppose that the attacker’s interference power process
{v(t) ∈ [0,∞)}t∈N0 satisfies Assumption 3.2. Then for every α1 ≥
0, α0 ≥ 0 that satisfy (20), there exists a scalar d ≥ 0 such that
t−2∑
j=0
E
[ t−1∏
i=j+1
(α1l(i) + α0)
]
≤ d, t ∈ {2, 3, . . .}. (32)
Proof: Since (20) holds, it follows from Lemma 3.4 that
E[
∏t−1
i=j+1(α1l(i)+α0)] ≤ µθ(t−j−1), where µ ≥ 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1)
are scalars that depend on α1 and α0. Letting
d , µ/(1− θ), (33)
we obtain
∑t−2
j=0 E
[∏t−1
i=j+1(α1l(i) + α0)
]
≤∑t−2j=0 µθ(t−j−1) =
µ
∑t−1
i=1 θ
i ≤ µ∑∞i=0 θi = d, which completes the proof.
In Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5, we obtained the upper-bounding in-
equalities (21) and (32) concerning the transmission failure indicator
process {l(t) ∈ {0, 1}}t∈N0 . In our proof of Theorem 3.3 given
below, we utilize these inequalities.
Proof of Theorem 3.3: By (16) and (17),
‖x(t)‖2 ≤ c2
c1
(
t−1∏
i=0
(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
)
‖x0‖2
+
c2
c1
( t−2∑
j=0
( t−1∏
i=j+1
(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
)
+ 1
)
w,
almost surely, and hence, for t ∈ N,
E[‖x(t)‖2] ≤ c2
c1
E
[ t−1∏
i=0
(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
]‖x0‖2
+
c2
c1
( t−2∑
j=0
E
[ t−1∏
i=j+1
(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
]
+ 1
)
w. (34)
Next, we apply Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5 to obtain upper-bounds for the
expectation terms on the right-hand side of (34). First, since ‖A‖ > 1,
(18) implies ‖A + BK‖ ∈ [0, 1). Thus, we have ζ1 > 0 and ζ0 ∈
[0, 1). By letting α1 = ζ1 and α0 = ζ0, (18) implies (20). Therefore,
by Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5, we have E
[∏t−1
i=0(ζ1l(i)+ ζ0)
] ≤ µθt and∑t−2
j=0 E
[∏t−1
i=j+1(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
] ≤ d, where µ ≥ 0, θ ∈ (0, 1), and
d ≥ 0 are scalars that depend on ζ1 and ζ0. Hence, with
θˆ , θ, µˆ , µc2/c1, dˆ , (d+ 1)c2/c1, (35)
the inequality (19) follows from (34). 
Remark 3.6: By using (35) together with (28), (31), and (33), we
can obtain the values of θˆ, µˆ, and dˆ as
θˆ = (1− pˆ( κˆ
T ∗
+ vˆ))‖A+BK‖+ pˆ( κˆ
T ∗
+ vˆ)‖A‖, (36)
µˆ =
c2
c1
‖A‖T∗−1θˆ−(T∗−1), (37)
dˆ =
c2
c1
(‖A‖T∗−1θˆ−(T∗−1)
1− θˆ + 1
)
, (38)
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where T ∗ is a positive integer that satisfies
(1− pˆ( κˆ
T ∗
+ vˆ))‖A+BK‖+ pˆ( κˆ
T ∗
+ vˆ)‖A‖ < 1,
and c1, c2 > 0 are scalars that satisfy (15). The attacker with
large resources can cause the state norm to grow large. This is also
indicated in the upper bound for the first moment given in (19). In
particular, if κˆ in Assumption 3.2 is large, then T ∗ is large, which
makes µˆ large, as µˆ is an increasing function of T ∗. Further, since
c2
c1
( µˆ
1− (1− pˆ(vˆ))‖A+BK‖ − pˆ(vˆ)‖A‖ + 1
)
≤ dˆ,
we observe that dˆ is large for large values of µˆ and vˆ. On the other
hand, for large values of T ∗, θˆ is close to (1− pˆ(vˆ))‖A+BK‖+
pˆ(vˆ)‖A‖. If the upper bound vˆ of average interference powers is
large, then µˆθˆt in (19) converges slowly, since θˆ is close to 1.
D. Jamming and Disturbance with Finite Second Moment
In Theorem 3.3, we explored the case where the disturbance norm
is bounded at each time almost surely. Next, we investigate scenarios
where the disturbance may not be bounded. We obtain a relation
between the state and the disturbance similar to those used for noise-
to-state stability analysis of stochastic systems (e.g., [19], [20]).
Specifically, in the next result, we provide an upper bound for the
first moment of state by utilizing the second moment of disturbance.
Theorem 3.7: Consider the closed-loop networked control sys-
tem (5). Suppose that the attacker’s interference power process
{v(t) ∈ [0,∞)}t∈N0 satisfies Assumption 3.2. Furthermore, suppose
E[‖w(t)‖22] <∞, t ∈ N0. If
(1− pˆ(vˆ))‖A+BK‖2 + pˆ(vˆ)‖A‖2 < 1, (39)
then there exist µˆ, fˆ ≥ 0, and θˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that for t ∈ N,
E[‖x(t)‖2] ≤ µˆθˆt‖x0‖2 + fˆ max
i∈{0,...,t−1}
(E[‖w(i)‖22])
1
2 . (40)
The proof of this result relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 3.8: Suppose that the attacker’s interference power process
{v(t) ∈ [0,∞)}t∈N0 satisfies Assumption 3.2. Then for every γ1 ≥
0, γ0 ≥ 0 that satisfy
(γ21 + 2γ1γ0)pˆ(vˆ) + γ
2
0 < 1, (41)
there exists a scalar f ≥ 0 such that
t−2∑
j=0
(
E
[( t−1∏
i=j+1
(γ1l(i) + γ0)
)2]) 12 ≤ f, t ∈ {2, 3, . . .}. (42)
Proof: For every j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t − 2}, t ∈ {2, 3, . . .},
we have (
∏t−1
i=j+1(γ1l(i) + γ0))
2 =
∏t−1
i=j+1(γ1l(i) + γ0)
2 =∏t−1
i=j+1(γ
2
1 l
2(i) + 2γ1γ0l(i) + γ
2
0). Let α1 , γ
2
1 + 2γ1γ0 and
α0 , γ
2
0 . Since l
2(i) = l(i), it follows that
E
[( t−1∏
i=j+1
(γ1l(i) + γ0)
)2]
= E
[ t−1∏
i=j+1
(α1l(i) + α0)
]
. (43)
By (41), (20) holds. Therefore, it follows from Lemma 3.4 that
E
[∏t−1
i=j+1(α1l(i) + α0)
]
≤ µθ(t−j−1), where µ ≥ 0 and θ ∈
(0, 1) are scalars that depend on α1 and α0. Letting
f , µ
1
2 /(1− θ 12 ), (44)
we obtain
t−2∑
j=0
(
E
[( t−1∏
i=j+1
(γ1l(i) + γ0)
)2]) 12 ≤ t−2∑
j=0
µ
1
2 θ
1
2
(t−j−1)
= µ
1
2
t−1∑
i=1
θ
1
2
i ≤ µ 12
∞∑
i=0
θ
1
2
i = f, (45)
which completes the proof.
Lemma 3.8 enables us to deal with quadratic terms that involve
the failure indicator l(·). We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.7.
Proof of Theorem 3.7: By (16),
E[‖x(t)‖2] ≤ c2
c1
E
[ t−1∏
i=0
(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
]‖x0‖2
+
c2
c1
t−2∑
j=0
E
[( t−1∏
i=j+1
(ζ1l(i) + α0)
)
‖w(j)‖2
]
+
c2
c1
E[‖w(t− 1)‖2], t ∈ N. (46)
To show (40), we obtain upper bounds for the expectation terms
on the right-hand side of (46) by using Schwarz’s and Jensen’s
inequalities. First, by Schwarz’s inequality (see Section 6.8 of [28]),
E
[( t−1∏
i=j+1
(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
)
‖w(j)‖2
]
≤
(
E
[( t−1∏
i=j+1
(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
)2]) 12 (
E[‖w(j)‖22]
) 1
2 . (47)
Furthermore, by Jensen’s inequality (see Section 6.6 of [28]),
E[‖w(t − 1)‖2] ≤
(
E[‖w(t− 1)‖22]
) 1
2 . (48)
As
(
E
[(∏t−1
i=j+1(ζ1l(i)+ζ0)
)2]) 12 ≥ 0, we obtain from (46)–(48),
E[‖x(t)‖2] ≤ c2
c1
E
[ t−1∏
i=0
(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
]‖x0‖2
+
c2
c1
(
t−2∑
j=0
(
E
[( t−1∏
i=j+1
(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
)2]) 12
+ 1
)
· max
i∈{0,...,t−1}
(E[‖w(i)‖22])
1
2 , t ∈ N. (49)
First, we apply Lemma 3.4 to find an upper bound of the term
E
[∏t−1
i=0(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
]
on the right-hand side of (49). To this end
let α1 , ζ1 and α2 , ζ2. Since ‖A‖ > 1, it follows from (39) that
‖A + BK‖ < 1. As a result, α1 = ζ1 > 0 and α0 = ζ0 ∈ [0, 1).
Furthermore, (39) implies (ζ21 + 2ζ1ζ0)pˆ(vˆ) + ζ
2
0 < 1. Using this
inequality together with pˆ(vˆ) ≤ 1, we obtain
(ζ1pˆ(vˆ) + ζ0)
2 = ζ21 pˆ
2(vˆ) + 2ζ1ζ0pˆ(vˆ) + ζ
2
0
≤ (ζ21 + 2ζ1ζ0)pˆ(vˆ) + ζ20 < 1,
which implies (20). It then follows from Lemma 3.4 that
E
[ t−1∏
i=0
(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
] ≤ µθt, (50)
where µ ≥ 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1) depend on ζ1 and ζ0. Next, we
apply Lemma 3.8 to find an upper bound of the summation term∑t−2
j=0
(
E
[(∏t−1
i=j+1(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
)2]) 12
. Specifically, let γ1 , ζ1
and γ0 , ζ0. By (39), we have (41). Noting that γ1 > 0 and
γ0 ∈ [0, 1), we obtain by Lemma 3.8 that
t−2∑
j=0
(
E
[( t−1∏
i=j+1
(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
)2]) 12 ≤ f, (51)
where f ≥ 0 depends on ζ1 and ζ0. Now, by letting
θˆ , θ, µˆ , µc2/c1, fˆ , (f + 1)c2/c1, (52)
we obtain (40) from (49)–(51). 
Theorem 3.7 is applicable to scenarios where the condition (17)
of Theorem 3.3 may fail to hold. In particular, if the entries of the
disturbance vector has distributions with infinite support, then (17)
does not hold (e.g., w(t) ∼ N (m,Σ) where m ∈ Rn and Σ ∈
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Fig. 2. Effect of jamming attacks following (12) with and without
disturbance (Top: τ1 = 960, τ2 = 40, v∗ = 32; Bottom: τ1 = 1440,
τ2 = 60, v∗ = 32). Approximate first moments E[‖x(t)‖2] are
obtained through 500 simulations with the initial state x0 = [1, 1]T.
R
n×n is a positive-definite matrix). In such cases, Theorem 3.7 can
be utilized. If E[‖w(t)‖22] ≤ w˜ holds for all t ∈ N0 with a scalar
w˜ ≥ 0, then it follows from (40) that lim supt→∞ E[‖x(t)‖2] ≤
fˆ w˜
1
2 , indicating the long-run boundedness of expected state norm.
Although Theorem 3.7 is applicable to a wider range of scenarios
in terms of the disturbance, the condition (39) concerning the
average jamming attack interference power is more restrictive than
the condition (18) of Theorem 3.3. In particular, we have
(
(1 −
pˆ(vˆ))‖A+BK‖+ pˆ(vˆ)‖A‖)2 < (1− pˆ(vˆ))‖A+BK‖2+ pˆ(vˆ)‖A‖2
for pˆ(vˆ) ∈ (0, 1) indicating that (39) implies (18), but not vice versa.
It is interesting that both Theorems 3.3 and 3.7 can be used for
assessing stability in the scenarios where the transmission failure
indicator process {l(t)}t∈N0 and the disturbance process {w(t)}t∈N0
are dependent. This is the case, e.g., when the state measurements
received by the controller are subject to noise. Further, the processes
{l(t)}t∈N0 and {w(t)}t∈N0 would also be dependent if the dis-
turbance is partially/fully caused by the attacker, and the jamming
interference results in errors in the control input packet content.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Consider the networked control system (5) with
A =
[
0.1 −1
1.1 1.8
]
, B =
[
0
1
]
, K = [−0.9277 − 1.2615],
and the wireless channel whose transmission failure probability
function p is given by (3) where c = 1, ξ = 3, and σ = 0.4.
In [18], we investigated almost sure asymptotic stability of this
system for the disturbance-free case (w(t) = 0, t ∈ N0). There, we
used the concave, continuous, and nondecreasing function pˆ(ϑ) ,
p(ϑ + ψ) with ψ , (cξ − 3σ)/3, which upper-bounds p according
to (7). By Theorem 3.5 of [18], the closed-loop system is almost
surely asymptotically stable under any jamming attacks that satisfy
Assumption 3.1 with v ≤ 3.5. The analysis in [18] is Lyapunov-
based, and for the case with v = 3.5, it utilizes the Lyapunov-like
function V (x) , xTPx with the positive-definite matrix
P =
[
0.7728 0.8554
0.8554 3.2649
]
. (53)
The matrix P is also useful for the first-moment stability analysis
of this system. In particular, we use the matrix norm ‖ · ‖ induced
by the vector norm ‖x‖P ,
√
xTPx. By using this matrix norm,
the condition (9) is satisfied for v ≤ 1.29. From Proposition 3.1, the
networked control system (5) without disturbance is first-moment ge-
ometrically stable under jamming attacks that satisfy Assumption 3.1
with v ≤ 1.29. Hence, in the disturbance-free case E[‖x(t)‖2]
converges to zero with a geometric rate.
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)‖
2
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Time [t]
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)]
Fig. 3. Approximate expected values of total state norm (top) and total
transmission power (bottom) for different countermeasure parameters
compared to the case with no countermeasures from Fig. 2.
1) Disturbance-free scenario: As discussed in Section III-B,
Assumption 3.1 allows the attacker to jam the channel with very large
interference powers after waiting without attacking for sufficiently
long durations. For instance, for the attack strategy considered in
(12) with τ1 = 960, τ2 = 40, and v
∗ = 32, Assumption 3.1 is
satisfied with κ = 0 and v = 1.28. In the disturbance-free case,
this attack strategy does not create a problem for stability since v
is sufficiently small. In particular, after the long duration τ1 without
attacks, the state norm gets very close to zero, and as a result, the
state norm after the attack period of τ2 time steps is also small.
2) Scenarios with disturbance: By contrast, in the case with
disturbance, the attack strategy (12) makes the state norm grow at
time τ1+τ2. This is because, even after the long attack-free duration,
the state norm cannot get close to zero due to the disturbance. This
is shown in the top part of Fig. 2 where the disturbance w(t) at each
time t is uniformly distributed in [−0.5, 0.5]. Under disturbance, the
length τ2 of the attack period directly affects the growth of the state
norm. The attacker can increase the waiting time τ1 to attack with a
longer duration τ2 with the same high interference power v
∗ to make
the state norm grow, while still satisfying Assumption 3.1.
In the bottom part of Fig. 2, we see that for the same level of
disturbance but with τ2 = 60, the state is driven to larger values.
Notice that with τ1 = 1440, τ2 = 60, and v
∗ = 32, Assumption 3.1
is also satisfied with κ = 0 and v = 1.28. Although after the time
τ1 + τ2, the effect of the attack diminishes, the attacker can repeat
cycles of sleeping and jamming, and the state norm may grow if the
attacker uses higher interference powers for longer durations.
To guarantee a predetermined bound on the expected state norm,
interference power levels need to be restricted. This is achieved by
Assumption 3.2. Under Assumption 3.2, the attacker can attack with
a jamming interference power v∗ > vˆ consecutively for at most
⌊κˆ/(v∗−vˆ)⌋ time steps. For instance, with κˆ = 1228.8 and vˆ = 1.28,
the jamming attacks in the top part of Fig. 2 satisfy Assumption 3.2.
However, the jamming attacks in the bottom part of the figure do
not satisfy Assumption 3.2 with the same κˆ and vˆ due to the longer
attack duration. For a duration of 60 time steps, the maximum allowed
interference power is v∗ = 21.76. We remark that the parameters κˆ
and vˆ can be selected to reflect the capabilities of the attacker.
If the jamming strategy satisfies Assumption 3.2 with vˆ ≤ 1.29,
then by Theorem 3.3, the first moment of the state satisfies the
bound in (19) for any bounded disturbance. If the disturbance is
not bounded, then Theorem 3.7 can be applied; by Theorem 3.7, the
bound in (40) holds if the attacker is less powerful with vˆ ≤ 0.345.
3) Countermeasures against jamming: The damaging effects
of the jamming attacks can be reduced by adjusting the transmission
power (ξ in (3)). In particular, the controller can improve the overall
performance by increasing the transmission power when there are
many consecutive failures. This countermeasure against jamming can
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be described as follows. If l(t − i) = 1 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , NC}
(representing NC total consecutive failures), then at time t, the
transmission power ξ(t) is set to a value ξC (larger than the nominal
value 3 used above) for a duration of TC time steps. Thus, at those
time steps, failures become less likely. After TC time steps, the
transmission power is set back to its nominal (lower) value and
the countermeasure system restarts counting consecutive failures. We
explore the effectiveness of this countermeasure against the attacks
that are illustrated in the bottom part of Fig. 2. Specifically, Fig. 3
shows the expected total state norm (
∑t−1
i=0 E[‖x(i)‖2]) and expected
total transmission power (
∑t−1
i=0 E[ξ(i)]) approximated through 500
simulations for different parameter values ξC ∈ {6, 12}, NC ∈
{2, 4}, TC ∈ {4, 8}. The results indicate that the effects of jamming
can be mitigated by temporarily increasing transmission powers, and
the performance gets better with larger total transmission power use.
V. CONCLUSION
We explored the networked control problem under jamming attacks
with time-varying interference power. Specifically, we investigated
the joint effects of jamming attacks and disturbance, and obtained
conditions under which the first moment of the state stays bounded.
Our results indicate that if the disturbance is known to be bounded,
larger average jamming interference powers can be allowed.
One of our future research directions is to increase robustness prop-
erties of the overall system by utilizing predictive control approaches
proposed previously in [13]. Another future work is to provide
an analysis of the networked control system under time-varying
transmission powers. In this line of research, for a wireless networked
control problem without attacks, [29] recently explored stability and
energy-efficiency under time-varying transmission powers.
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APPENDIX
The proof of Proposition 3.1 is based on the following result.
Lemma A.1: Suppose that the attacker’s interference power pro-
cess {v(t) ∈ [0,∞)}t∈N0 satisfies Assumption 3.1. Then for every
α1 ≥ 0, α0 ≥ 0 that satisfy
α1pˆ(v) + α0 < 1, (54)
there exist scalars µ ≥ 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1) such that
E[
t−1∏
i=0
(α1l(i) + α0)] ≤ µθt, t ∈ N. (55)
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.4. In particular,
we have (23) and (24) with t1 = 0, t2 = t, h(v) , α1pˆ(v) +
α0, and hence, E[
∏t−1
i=0(α1l(i) + α0)] ≤ E[ht( 1t
∑t−1
i=0 v(i))]. By
Assumption 3.1, we then obtain E[ht( 1t
∑t−1
i=0 v(i))] ≤ ht(κt + v).
Therefore, by (54), after letting T ∗ be a positive integer such that
h( κT∗ + v) < 1 and defining
θ , h(
κ
T ∗
+ v), µ , (α1 + α0)
T∗−1θ−(T
∗−1), (56)
we obtain (55).
Proof of Proposition 3.1: By (16) with w(t) = 0, t ∈ N0, we have
E[‖x(t)‖2] ≤ c2
c1
E
[ t−1∏
i=0
(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
]
‖x0‖2. (57)
Next, we apply Lemma A.1. First, since ‖A‖ > 1, (9) implies
‖A + BK‖ ∈ [0, 1), and thus, ζ1 > 0, ζ0 ∈ [0, 1). With α1 = ζ1
and α0 = ζ0, (9) implies (54). Therefore, by Lemma A.1, we have
E
[∏t−1
i=0(ζ1l(i) + ζ0)
] ≤ µθt, where µ ≥ 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1). Hence,
by (57), the inequality (10) holds with µ , c2c1
µ and θ = θ. 
